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NEUROSCIENCE, CRIMINAL SENTENCING, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS

ELIZABETH SHAW*
ABSTRACT
This Article discusses ways in which neuroscience should inform
criminal sentencing in the future. Specifically, it compares the ethical
permissibility of traditional forms of punishment, such as incarceration, on the one hand, and rehabilitative “neurointerventions” on the
other. Rehabilitative neurointerventions are interventions that aim
directly to modify brain activity in order to reduce reoffending.
Various jurisdictions are already using techniques that could be
classed as neurointerventions, and research suggests that, potentially, an even wider range of rehabilitative neurointerventions may
be developed. This Article examines the role of human rights (in
particular, the moral right to mental integrity and the legal right
against degrading treatment) as a constraint on the state’s use of
neurointerventions. It also discusses the extent to which traditional
forms of punishment, such as incarceration, interfere with the right
to mental integrity.

* Elizabeth Shaw is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Law, University of Aberdeen. She
received her LLB and LLM by research from the University of Aberdeen. She received her
PhD from the University of Edinburgh in 2013. She is a co-director of the Justice Without
Retribution Network. Her research interests are interdisciplinary, involving criminal law,
philosophy and neuroscience. She is a co-editor of Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society
(Cambridge University Press, 2019), and The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Science
of Punishment (Routledge, 2021).
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INTRODUCTION
This Article will discuss ways in which neuroscience should
inform criminal sentencing in the future. Specifically, it will compare the ethical permissibility of traditional forms of punishment,
such as incarceration, on the one hand, and rehabilitative “neurointerventions” on the other. Rehabilitative neurointerventions are
interventions that aim directly to modify brain activity in order to
reduce reoffending.1 As I will explain below, various jurisdictions
are already using techniques that could be classed as neurointerventions, and research suggests that, potentially, an even wider
range of rehabilitative neurointerventions may be developed. This
Article will examine the role of human rights (in particular, the
moral right to mental integrity2 and the legal right against degrading treatment3) as a constraint on the state’s use of neurointerventions. It will also discuss the extent to which traditional forms
of punishment, such as incarceration, interfere with the right to
mental integrity.
Many jurisdictions rely heavily on incarceration as the default
response to serious crime.4
1. For brevity, “neurointerventions” will be used to refer to rehabilitative neurointerventions. For similar use of the term neurointervention, see, for example, TREATMENT FOR
CRIME: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON NEUROINTERVENTIONS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1-2 (David
Birks & Thomas Douglas eds., 2018) [hereinafter TREATMENT FOR CRIME]; JESPER RYBERG,
NEUROINTERVENTIONS, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT: ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 1 (2019). The
terms “neurocorrective” or “direct brain intervention” are also used in the literature as synonyms for rehabilitative neurointervention. E.g., Thomas Douglas, Nonconsensual Neurocorrectives and Bodily Integrity: A Reply to Shaw and Barn, 12 NEUROETHICS 107, 107 (2019);
Elizabeth Shaw, Direct Brain Interventions and Responsibility Enhancement, 8 CRIM. L. &
PHIL. 1, 2 (2014).
2. See Thomas Douglas, Criminal Rehabilitation through Medical Intervention: Moral
Liability and the Right to Bodily Integrity, 18 J. ETHICS 101, 119 (2014). Douglas suggests that
the moral right to mental integrity is the “most promising” basis for objecting to
neurointerventions. Id. For some discussion of the right to mental integrity in the context of
neurointerventions, see, for example, Elizabeth Shaw, The Right to Bodily Integrity and the
Rehabilitation of Offenders Through Medical Interventions: A Reply to Thomas Douglas, 12
NEUROETHICS 97, 98, 101 (2019); David Birks & Alena Buyx, Punishing Intentions and
Neurointerventions, 9 AJOB NEUROSCIENCE 133, 136 (2018).
3. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR] (“No one shall be
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”).
4. See Birks & Buyx, supra note 2, at 133.
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The United States has the highest incarceration rate in the
world,5 with a prison population of 1,430,800 people.6 With an
incarceration rate of 144 prisoners per 100,000 inhabitants,
England and Wales have the highest incarceration rate in Western
Europe.7 The prison population was 78,058 in March 2021 (having
decreased due to COVID-19),8 but it is predicted to increase to
98,700 by September 2026.9 Imprisonment comes at a high economic
cost to society—39 billion dollars of taxpayers’ money is spent on
incarceration each year in the United States.10 Incarceration also
comes at great personal cost to prisoners—according to a study of
twenty-four high-income countries, the suicide rate among female
prisoners is nine times higher than that of the general female
population, and the suicide rate among male prisoners is three
times that of the general male population.11 Separation from family
and friends, severely restricted freedom, and the stigma of incarceration, as well as dangerous and overcrowded conditions, are among
the factors that can contribute to prisoner suicides.12 It has been
argued that if neurointerventions are developed to effectively aid
criminal rehabilitation, then these interventions have the potential
to generate economic savings and to spare offenders suffering by
allowing them to avoid incarceration or be released earlier,13
5. Highest to Lowest: Prison Population Total, WORLD PRISON BRIEF, https://www.prison
studies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison_population_rate?field_region_taxonomy_tid=All
[https://perma.cc/WG8Y-4VPJ].
6. E. ANN CARSON, PRISONERS IN 2019, NCJ 2551155, at 3 (2020), https://bjs.ojp.gov/
library/publications/prisoners-2019 [https://perma.cc/XJ7T-G6FP].
7. GEORGINA STURGE, UK PRISON POPULATION STATISTICS, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIB. NO.
CBP-04334, 2020, at 24 (UK), https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/
SN04334/SN04334.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5TH-8NKD].
8. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, OFFENDER MANAGEMENT STATISTICS BULLETIN, ENGLAND AND
WALES, 2020, at 2 (UK), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/982382/Offender_Management_Statistics_Quarterly_Q4_202
0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QZP-EY4P].
9. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, PRISON POPULATION PROJECTIONS 2020 TO 2026, ENGLAND AND
WALES, 2020, at 1 (UK), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/938571/Prison_Population_Projections_2020_to_2026
.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VT7-K3HM].
10. Birks & Buyx, supra note 2, at 133.
11. Seena Fazel et al., Suicide in Prisons: An International Study of Prevalence and
Contributory Factors, 4 LANCET PSYCHIATRY 946, 951 (2017).
12. Shaoling Zhong et al., Risk Factors for Suicide in Prisons: A Systematic Review and
Meta-Analysis, 6 LANCET PUB. HEALTH e164, e166-70 (2021).
13. E.g., Douglas, supra note 2, at 103; Birks & Buyx, supra note 2.
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although, some fear that the dangers of mandatory neurointerventions may outweigh their advantages.14 It is, therefore, of practical importance to compare these possible responses to crime and
to consider how society can seek to reduce crime in a humane and
effective way.
After briefly outlining examples of current and potential neurointerventions in Part II, this Article will then focus, in Part III, on
an influential objection against neurointerventions— the idea that
neurointerventions threaten mental integrity in a way that prison
does not. Growing evidence of incarceration’s negative psychological
and neurological effects presents a challenge for this objection.15
Such evidence has been among the factors that have led some academics to raise the question of whether we should treat neurointerventions and prison on a par.16 In defense of the original
objection, it has been replied that even if, in some cases, prison
infringes mental integrity to a similar extent as neurointerventions,
the impact of prison on mental integrity is merely foreseen, whereas
the threat that neurointerventions pose to mental integrity is
intended.17 Part III of this Article will critique this attempt to salvage the mental-integrity-based objection against neurointerventions. This Article will attempt to cast some doubt on whether the
intention/side effect distinction has the moral weight in this context
that has often been assigned to it. It will be argued that the intention/side effect distinction does not warrant regarding mandatory
incarceration as being significantly less problematic than mandatory neurointerventions in cases where the adverse effects of prison
and neurointerventions are similarly severe.
Part IV will discuss some of the practical implications of this
argument. If we should regard the adverse effects of prison and
neurointerventions as roughly morally equivalent (where they are
similarly severe), one way to respond is to be equally willing to
14. E.g., RYBERG, supra note 1; Shaw, supra note 1.
15. E.g., Sjors Ligthart et al., Prison and the Brain: Neuropsychological Research in the
Light of the European Convention on Human Rights, 10 NEW J. EUR. CRIM. L. 287, 299-300
(2019); GREGG D. CARUSO, REJECTING RETRIBUTIVISM: FREE WILL, PUNISHMENT, AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 229-60 (2021).
16. E.g., Douglas, supra note 1, at 117; James Edgar Lim, Is Incarceration Better than
Neurointervention? On the Intended Harms of Prison, 9 AJOB NEUROSCIENCE 168, 169 (2018).
17. Birks & Buyx, supra note 2, at 134.
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impose either and to allow the state to impose whichever is most
effective at preventing crime. In contrast, this Article will favor a
second, human-rights-based approach. I will suggest that the state
has strong obligations to research techniques that minimize adverse
so-called side effects or any adverse effects on mental integrity and
to offer prisoners the choice where possible between prison and
rehabilitative interventions. In the light of the philosophical discussion, this Article will make some suggestions about what would
be the most ethically defensible interpretation and development of
certain aspects of the legal right against degrading treatment.
I. EXAMPLES OF NEUROINTERVENTIONS
As Areti Theofilopoulou notes, “[t]he most widely discussed case
of neurointerventions in the context of criminal justice is that of
anti-libidinal pharmacological agents administered to sex offenders.”18 In the literature on neurointerventions, anti-libidinal drugs19
that reduce the effects or production of testosterone are considered
neurointerventions because they have a considerable impact on the
brain and on aspects of the individual’s psychology such as sexual
thoughts, desires, and motivations.20 It has been suggested that the
effects of anti-libidinal drugs on the brain are even more important
in addressing sexual offending than the drugs’ physical effects on
sexual functioning.21 Even if someone’s ability to engage in penetrative sexual activity has been reduced/removed, the person can
still find ways of committing serious sexual offenses if the desire/
18. Areti Theofilopoulou, Punishment as Moral Fortification and Non-Consensual
Neurointerventions, 38 LAW & PHIL. 149, 155 (2019).
19. The terms “anti-androgens” or “chemical castration” are sometimes used to refer to
such drugs. Anti-libidinal effects can be produced by hormonal testosterone-supressing drugs
such as cyproterone acetate, or by nonhormonal drugs such as some antipsychotics and
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor antidepressants. See Omer Khan et al., Pharmacological Interventions for Those Who Have Sexually Offended or Are at Risk of Offending, 2
COCHRANE DATABASE OF SYSTEMATIC REVS. 1, 6 (2015).
20. See, e.g., David JE Byrne, Neurointerventions, Recidivist Sex Offenders, and Situated
Moral Agency: An Approach from the Margins, 9 AJOB NEUROSCIENCE 158 (2018); Birks &
Buyx, supra note 2, at 133; Jonathan Pugh & Hannah Maslen, ‘Drugs That Make You Feel
Bad?’ Remorse-Based Mitigation and Neurointerventions, 11 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 499, 500, 506-7
(2017).
21. See Henry T. Greely & Nita A. Farahany, Neuroscience and the Criminal Justice
System, 2 ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY 451, 466 (2019).
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motivation to do so remains.22 Don Grubin explains the link between
testosterone and the motivation to commit sexual offenses as
follows:
In the male brain, testosterone receptors are most dense in
hypothalamic nuclei, the amygdala and other areas of the limbic
system, the prefrontal cortex, and the temporal cortex, all parts
of the brain known to be involved in processing sexual stimuli or
initiating or maintaining sexual behavior.... testosterone has
effects on the responsiveness of both general and specific
neurological arousal mechanisms, it influences the processing of
sexual sensory stimuli, it impacts on motivation, attention, and
mood, and it is associated with aggression and dominance, all of
which are potentially relevant to sexually problematic behaviour. Therefore, treatments aimed at moderating the activity of
testosterone ... can ... weaken the foundation on which sex
offending sits.23

A variety of jurisdictions currently administer anti-libidinal drugs
to sex offenders under either statutory provisions that specifically
concern sexual behavior24 or general mental health legislation.25
Depending on the jurisdiction, these interventions may be offered on
a voluntary basis within prison or in the community,26 imposed as
a compulsory treatment in the community or as a mandatory condition of parole,27 or exchanged for early release.28 It is not the
purpose of this Article to engage in an analysis of legislation on this
22. See id.
23. Don Grubin, The Pharmacological Treatment of Sex Offenders, in THE WILEY
BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC NEUROSCIENCE 703, 711-12 (Anthony R. Beech et al. eds.,
2018).
24. For example, California authorizes medroxyprogesterone acetate treatment for certain
sexual offenders with victims under thirteen years old. CAL. PENAL CODE § 645 (West 2019).
25. For example, England and Wales permit the Secretary of State to regulate the
administration of medicine to detainees for treatment of mental health disorders. Mental
Health Act 1983, c. 20, § 58 (UK).
26. See generally Grubin, supra note 23, at 718 (identifying treatment options aimed at
preventing recidivism and those taken in the course of psychological therapy).
27. See Lisa Forsberg & Thomas Douglas, Anti-Libidinal Interventions in Sex Offenders:
Medical or Correctional?, 24 MED. L. REV. 453, 458, 461-62 (2016).
28. For example, in Western Australia, offenders’ participation in sex offender treatment
programs can be taken into account in decisions about releasing the offender. Parole and
Sentencing Legislation Amendment Act 2006 (WA) s5A (Austl.).
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topic in a specific jurisdiction, but rather to discuss general moral
principles and considerations relating to the human right against
degrading treatment, which could be applied to such domestic
laws.29
Concerns have been raised that, despite the widespread use of
anti-libidinal treatments within criminal justice systems, the evidence concerning their effectiveness is not robust.30 However, some
studies have suggested that, at least for some offenders, antilibidinal treatments are more effective than psychological therapies,
such as cognitive behavioral therapy, although anti-libidinal
interventions are usually administered in conjunction with psychological therapies.31 Anti-libidinal treatments are also likely to be
more effective at rehabilitating offenders post-release than incarceration alone.32 Although incarceration prevents re-offending
against members of the public (though not necessarily other prisoners) while the offender is detained, and some offenders subjected
to longer sentences may “age out” of offending while incarcerated,33
it has nevertheless been shown that incarceration has a “criminogenic effect” for a significant proportion of offenders34 and likewise
some group psychological behavior programs can also increase reoffending.35
Research suggests the potential development of a wider range of
rehabilitative neurointerventions in the future. Potential treatments include using drugs that modulate the neurotransmitter
29. For a comparison of some of the domestic legal regimes governing the provision of sex
offender treatments, see Lisa Forsberg, Crime-Preventing Neurointerventions and the Law:
Learning from Anti-Libidinal Interventions, in TREATMENT FOR CRIME, supra note 1, at 44, 4648, 52-53.
30. Khan et al., supra note 19, at 7.
31. Friedrich Lösel & Martin Schmucker, The Effectiveness of Treatment for Sexual
Offenders: A Comprehensive Meta-Analysis, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 117, 135 (2005).
32. Daniel S. Nagin et al., Imprisonment and Reoffending, in 38 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A
REVIEW OF RESEARCH 115, 138 (Michael Tonry ed., 2009).
33. See TREATMENT FOR CRIME, supra note 1, at 2.
34. See Nagin et al., supra note 32, at 144-45.
35. AIDAN MEWS ET AL., MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, IMPACT EVALUATION OF THE PRISON-BASED
CORE SEX OFFENDER TREATMENT PROGRAMME (2017) (UK), https://assets.publishing.service.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/623876/sotp-report-web-.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7YJP-NHS4]. For discussion, see Elizabeth Shaw, Counterproductive Criminal Rehabilitation: Dealing with the Double-Edged Sword of Moral Bioenhancement via
Cognitive Enhancement, 65 INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY (2019).
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serotonin to reduce aggression and impulsivity36 and using
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS)—placing a device against
the skull that transmits magnetic pulses to stimulate nerve cells in
the brain—to increase empathy.37
Neurointerventions may cause a range of potentially worrying
mental and physical effects and side effects.38 This Article will focus
on the impact of neurointerventions on mental integrity, which, as
explained below, is distinct from physical symptoms or suffering
caused by these interventions. The mental integrity objection is
particularly significant because it can be argued that all neurointerventions affect mental integrity, whereas it is possible to imagine
neurointerventions that have minimal physical side effects and
cause minimal suffering.39 If the impact of neurointerventions on
mental integrity is problematic, then this would have wider implications than arguments based on the suffering or physical symptoms caused by neurointerventions.
II. INTENDED AND UNINTENDED EFFECTS ON MENTAL INTEGRITY:
PRISON VS. NEUROINTERVENTIONS
It has been argued that we can distinguish prison from neurointerventions based on the impact neurointerventions have on
mental integrity.40 Although it is often assumed that we have a
moral right to mental integrity, the literature on the precise scope
of this right is very limited.41 It is not possible within this Article to
give a complete account of the content of the right to mental
integrity. Rather, this Article will highlight the key aspects of this
36. Christopher Chew et al., Biological Interventions for Crime Prevention, in TREATMENT
supra note 1, at 11, 22-25.
37. E.g., Carmen S. Sergiou et al., The Effectiveness of Transcranial Direct Current
Stimulation as an Intervention to Improve Empathic Abilities and Reduce Violent Behavior:
A Literature Review, 55 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 1, 2 (2020).
38. See, e.g., Shaw, supra note 35, at 4; Birks & Buyx, supra note 2, at 135-37.
39. See Peter Vallentyne, Neurointerventions: Punishment, Mental Integrity, and
Intentions, 9 AJOB NEUROSCIENCE 131, 131-32 (2018). TMS may be a real-life example of a
neurointervention that causes minimal physical side effects and minimal suffering. See, e.g.,
Sergiou et. al, supra note 37, at 2.
40. See Shaw, supra note 2, at 98.
41. Douglas observes that “[v]ery little work has been done to determine ... what varieties
of mental influence” would infringe this right. Douglas, supra note 2, at 119.
FOR CRIME,
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right relevant to the comparison between prison and neurointerventions. The right to mental integrity can be infringed by
intentionally interfering with a person’s mental states through nonrational means.42 The wrongfulness of violating mental integrity
cannot be reduced to the wrongfulness of inflicting “the experiential
harm of suffering,” and mental integrity can be violated “without
any experiential harm.”43 Rather, the wrongfulness of violating
mental integrity lies in the disrespect that is shown for the victim’s
rational agency, and is connected with the intuition that interfering
with mental states through nonrational means can be “manipulative.”44
Although there is a widespread intuition that neurointerventions
pose a greater threat to mental integrity than prison, this intuition
has been challenged with reference to evidence that prison can
cause a range of adverse psychological and neurological effects.45
One possible response to that challenge involves drawing the
traditional distinction between intended effects and side effects.46
Neurointerventions can threaten mental integrity in two ways—
through both their intended effects and their side effects.47 Firstly,
regarding the intended effects of neurointerventions: even if these
interventions pursue legitimate aims, such as the rehabilitation
and/or reform of offenders, they achieve these aims through means
that bypass rational agency, thereby posing a threat to mental integrity.48 Secondly, the side effects of neurointerventions might be
thought to threaten mental integrity by interfering with offenders’
valuable mental states and choices.49 Neurointerventions might

42. Shaw, supra note 1, at 2, 7-8; Jan Christoph Bublitz & Reinhardt Merkel, Crimes
Against Minds: On Mental Manipulations, Harms and a Human Right to Mental SelfDetermination, 8 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 51, 73 (2014). One might wonder whether the right to
mental integrity protects all mental states. Birks and Douglas tentatively suggest that
interfering with all-things-considered “disvaluable” mental states may not be objectionable.
David Birks & Thomas Douglas, Two Ways to Frustrate a Desire, 51 J. VALUE INQUIRY 417,
418, 428-30 (2017). That issue will not be explored in the present Article.
43. Birks & Buyx, supra note 2, at 136.
44. See id. at 134.
45. Ligthart et al., supra note 15, at 298-300.
46. See Birks & Buyx, supra note 2, at 136.
47. Id. at 140.
48. See Shaw, supra note 1, at 2; Bublitz & Merkel, supra note 42.
49. See Birks & Buyx, supra note 2, at 136.
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eliminate or diminish some legitimate desires offenders may have.50
For example, as mentioned above, sex offenders are sometimes
given testosterone-lowering drugs to try to reduce their deviant
sexual desires.51 This treatment also interferes with their capacity
to experience legitimate sexual desires, impairing their ability to
engage in harmless sexual relationships.52 Aggression-lowering
neurointerventions, which might be developed in the future, would
aim at decreasing the likelihood of criminal violence, but could also
interfere with offenders’ legitimate desires and choices, such as a
passion for boxing, a decision to join the army, or the decision to use
force in self-defense.53
In contrast, it is often assumed that prison only threatens mental
integrity through its side effects and not through its intended
effects.54 The intended effects of prison—for example, communicating censure and being a forum in which an offender can reform—are
considered unproblematic, as the communication of censure and
attempt to reform offenders involves engaging with offenders’
rational agency.55 The side effects of prison might interfere with
offenders’ valuable mental states and choices by causing or worsening offenders’ mental health problems, either from separation from
friends and family, from the constraint on liberty, or from the
under-stimulating prison environment.56 However, according to the
traditional argument, the side effects of prison are not intended.57
The judge, when sentencing someone to prison, does not intend to
cause the person to experience mental health problems.
Many theorists believe that harms or rights infringements that
are caused intentionally are harder to justify than those that are
50. Id.
51. Khan et al., supra note 19.
52. Birks & Buyx, supra note 2, at 136.
53. See John Harris, Moral Enhancement and Freedom, 25 BIOETHICS 102, 105 (2011).
54. For a critical discussion of this assumption and of its supposed moral relevance, see
Adam J. Kolber, Unintentional Punishment, 18 LEGAL THEORY 1 (2012). For a long time, this
assumption has featured in discussions of the justifiability of prison versus “treatments” for
crime. See, e.g., Lawrence Stern, Freedom, Blame, and Moral Community, 71 J. PHIL. 72, 82
(1974) (conceding that “punishment does not aim to subvert rational and moral capacity” but
denying that this is enough to justify preferring traditional punishment to treatment
(emphasis added)).
55. See R. A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 28, 30, 108-09 (2001).
56. See Zhong et al., supra note 12.
57. See Kolber, supra note 54, at 2-3.
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foreseen side effects.58 If one subscribes to that view, one could
therefore argue that neurointerventions are harder to justify than
prison because neurointerventions interfere with mental integrity
intentionally (as well as through side effects), whereas prison only
interferes with mental integrity through side effects.59 To clarify:
this line of argument does not entail that causing adverse side
effects is unproblematic, but only that it is easier to justify than
causing intended harms or rights infringements.60 Theorists who
endorse this line of argument need not endorse current prison
conditions, which are often inhumane.61 Instead, these theorists
typically focus on humane prison conditions, which nevertheless
unavoidably have some negative side effects, and argue that if society only employed humane forms of imprisonment, then neurointerventions, with the same severity of negative side effects, would
be harder to justify than humane incarceration.62 For example,
David Birks and Alena Buyx state, “when we discuss incarceration,
we are imagining it to involve a diminution of the offender’s liberty,
but without the overcrowding and risk of assault commonly
experienced by incarcerated persons in the United States and
United Kingdom. We call this minimally decent incarceration.”63 In
the minimally decent incarceration context, harms to mental
integrity are considered “unintended but merely foreseen” while the
identical harms are considered “intended” in the rehabilitative
neurointervention context.64
Birks and Buyx made an important contribution to the debate
about the relative impact of neurointerventions and prison on
mental integrity by attempting to show that the intended effects of
neurointerventions on mental integrity are even more problematic
58. For useful overviews, see generally Warren S. Quinn, Actions, Intentions, and
Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 334 (1989); Dana Kay
Nelkin & Samuel C. Rickless, So Close, Yet So Far: Why Solutions to the Closeness Problem
for the Doctrine of Double Effect Fall Short, 49 NOÛS 376 (2015).
59. See Nelkin & Rickless, supra note 58, at 376, 378-79.
60. Birks & Buyx, supra note 2, at 136.
61. See, e.g., Heather Ann Thompson, What’s Hidden Behind The Walls of America’s
Prisons, THE CONVERSATION (June 4, 2017, 9:45 PM), https://theconversation.com/whatshidden-behind-the-walls-of-americas-prisons-77282 [https://perma.cc/4JB6-6FNP].
62. See Birks & Buyx, supra note 2, at 134.
63. Id. (citation omitted); see also Douglas, supra note 2, at 105-06.
64. Birks & Buyx, supra note 2, at 141.
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than previously assumed.65 Birks and Buyx argue that the intended
effects of neurointerventions are not limited to achieving punishment goals.66 They argue that what theorists previously categorized
as side effects of neurointerventions, such as dampening offenders’
legitimate desires, can actually be recharacterized as intended
effects.67 In contrast, according to Birks and Buyx, prison’s supposed
side effects, such as deterioration in mental health, genuinely are
side effects.68 They argue that if someone who administers a drug
knows that the drug produces more than one effect, then the person
who administers it intends to produce all the known effects of the
drug.69 So, if a testosterone-lowering drug is known to diminish both
(1) the desire to commit sexual offenses and (2) legitimate sexual
desires, the person who administers the drug cannot claim only to
have intended to diminish the desire to commit sexual offenses.70
According to Birks and Buyx, they must have intended to diminish
both (1) and (2); whereas traditionally, the diminishing of (2) would
have been considered a mere side effect.71 If Birks and Buyx’s
argument succeeds, it could make neurointerventions seem even
more problematic than they already appear on the traditional version of mental integrity-based objection.72 If intentionally diminishing illegitimate sexual desires using brain interventions is hard
to justify because it is a manipulative violation of mental integrity,
intentionally diminishing legitimate sexual desires might seem even
harder to justify.73
Birks and Buyx’s recharacterization of the diminishment of
legitimate desires as being an intended effect depends on the claim
that the effects of an action can only be considered “side effects” if
they are causally related to what one intended to do, rather than
65. See id. at 133-36, 141.
66. Id. at 137-41.
67. Id. at 141.
68. Id. Birks and Buyx do not reach a conclusion about whether neurointerventions are
objectionable all things considered. Their aim is limited to arguing that, in cases where neurointervention and prison have a similarly severe impact on mental integrity, neurointerventions are in one respect harder to justify. Id. at 134, 140-41.
69. Id. at 140.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 135, 140.
72. See id. at 134-35, 141.
73. See id.
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having a constitutive relationship to what one intended to do.74 To
illustrate this point, they draw on a famous example used by
Philippa Foot in which, during a cave exploration, the largest
explorer gets stuck in the only exit and cannot be moved.75 The only
way the other explorers can survive is to blow him up with dynamite
in order to escape the cave.76 (This example is introduced in order to
understand the meaning of the term “intention,” not in order to
discuss whether the explorers’ actions are ethically permissible.77)
The surviving explorers cannot argue that they did not intend to
kill their companion, but merely meant to blow him to pieces,
because blowing him to pieces is too “close” to killing him—blowing
him to pieces constitutes killing him, rather than merely causing his
death.78 Birks and Buyx apply this reasoning to the example of the
testosterone-lowering drug that diminishes both (1) illegitimate
sexual desires and (2) legitimate/valuable sexual desires, and they
conclude that: “The state of affairs of diminishing [the offender’s]
testosterone by administering [the neurointervention] is constitutive of the state of affairs of [the offender] being less likely to have
a valuable sexual desire.”79
However, it could be objected that there is a plausible analysis of
why the explorers, in the cave example, cannot dismiss the death of
their companion as a side effect, which is not analogous to the way
Birks and Buyx analyze the testosterone example. In the cave
example there is an intentional action—lighting the dynamite—
which causes an intended effect—someone being blown to bits.80
Their motive for causing him to be blown to bits is to escape, and
their companion being blown to bits is intended as a means of
escaping.81 The surviving explorers try to claim that lighting the

74. See id. at 138-39.
75. Id. at 138-39 (citing PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUE AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL
PHILOSOPHY 21-22 (D. Z. Phillips ed., 1978)).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 21.
78. See id. at 21-22.
79. Birks & Buyx, supra note 2, at 140.
80. See FOOT, supra note 75, at 21-22.
81. Id.
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dynamite has a side effect—the death of their companion—that is
separate from the intended effect.82 However, the surviving explorers’ argument fails because the intended effect—their companion
being blown to bits—is constitutive of the alleged side effect—the
death of their companion—so his death is considered an intended
effect.83
In contrast, in the testosterone example, there is an intentional
action—administering the testosterone-lowering drug—which has
the intended effect of diminishment of illegitimate sexual desires.84
The motive for administering the drug is to prevent re-offending,
and reducing illegitimate sexual desires is the means used to
achieve this.85 Those administering the drug claim that administering it has a side effect—diminishment of legitimate sexual desires—
which is separate from the intended effect—diminishment of
illegitimate sexual desires.86 For the next move to be parallel to my
analysis of the cave example, one would need to claim that the
intended effect—diminishment of illegitimate sexual desires—is
constitutive of the alleged side effect—diminishment of legitimate
sexual desires.87 But that claim is false. The illegitimate sexual
desire for example, the desire to have nonconsensual sex with a
minor, is a separate thing from the legitimate desire, to have
consensual sex with one’s adult partner.
Birks and Buyx claim that (1) lowering testosterone by administering the drug is constitutive of (2) being less likely to have a
valuable desire.88 They claim that these two states of affairs are
analogous to the two states of affairs that have a constitutive
relationship in the cave case: (1) blowing him up and (2) killing
him.89 However, on my analysis, the analogue of lowering testosterone by administering the drug is, in the cave case, the intentional
action of lighting the dynamite, which is not constitutive of the

82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See Birks & Buyx, supra note 2, at 139-40.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 135.
87. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text (discussing the intended and unintended
effects of testosterone-lowering drugs).
88. See Birks & Buyx, supra note 2, at 139-40.
89. Id. at 138-40.
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death of the explorer—it is purely the cause of his death.90 My
analysis therefore implies that the relationship between (1) lowering the offender’s testosterone by administering the drug causes
(2) the effect that the offender is less likely to have a valuable desire, and (1) does not constitute (2) the effect. On my analysis of the
cave case, the two states of affairs that have a constitutive (rather
than purely causal) relationship in the cave case are (1) the explorer
being blown to bits and (2) his death. The reason why the explorers
cannot deny intending to kill the trapped explorer is that they
intended to do an act—lighting the dynamite—in order to cause an
intended effect—their companion being blown to bits—that is
constitutive of his death; this is the same as intending to kill or
intending to cause death.
Although it is not within the scope of this Article to conclusively
establish that my analysis is correct,91 I will provide some reasons
for preferring my analysis to Birks and Buyx’s. Firstly, Birks and
Buyx’s analysis has the highly counterintuitive implication that
medicines never have known side effects, only intended effects.92
They acknowledge that:
[O]ne implication of this account is that whenever a drug is
administered to a patient with the knowledge that it is constitutive of the state of affairs of the patient experiencing side effects,
the side effects cannot be unintended. It is only if the doctor is
unaware that the drug has a particular side effect that it could
not be intended.93

However, it is counterintuitive to suggest that, for example, when
a doctor prescribes an antihistamine to relieve itchiness, which has
the side effect of causing drowsiness, the doctor intends to make the
patient drowsy. On my account, drowsiness and relief from itchiness
are two separate effects, which are not constitutively related to each
other (unlike being blown up and dying), and which are causally
90. See FOOT, supra note 75, at 21-22.
91. This would require engaging with the vast literature on intentions and side effects and
with debates about the different ways in which actions, and their relationship to their effects,
can be described.
92. See Birks & Buyx, supra note 2, at 135.
93. Id. at 141 n.34.
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related to the administration of the drug. However, relief from
itchiness is an intended effect, whereas drowsiness is an unintended
side effect. Few doctors would accept the idea that when they go into
work every day they are constantly forming intentions to cause their
patients nausea, dizziness, disability, pain, et cetera. The intuition
that medicines can have known but unintended side effects seems
at least as powerful as the intuitions about the cave example upon
which Birks and Buyx rely heavily, as they appeal to such intuitions
in lieu of providing complete definitions of the concepts of “constitutive” and “causal.”94 So, if the analysis of intentions and side effects
should account for powerful intuitions, rather than implying that
these intuitions should be discarded, then this provides some reasons for preferring my account to Birks and Buyx’s. My analysis is
consistent with strong intuitions about the cave case (that the explorers cannot intend to blow their companion to bits without intending to kill him) and does not require us to discard the powerful
intuition that medicines can have known unintended side effects.
This Article will now turn to the second part of Birks and Buyx’s
argument—that prison’s supposed side effects (such as deterioration
in mental health) genuinely are side effects.95 Giving the example of
restlessness, they claim that restricting someone’s freedom by
sending the offender to prison does not constitute negative mental
effects, but instead causes these unintended side effects.96 However,
the logic underlying their claim that medicines’ supposed side
effects are actually intended seems to imply that prison’s side effects
are intended as well.97 Birks and Buyx’s account stresses how
knowledge of the relationship between states of affairs can transform a side effect into an intended effect.98 They do not explain
exactly why it is obvious to most people that blowing someone up
constitutes killing them, whereas it is not obvious to most people—
at least initially—that medicines cannot have known side effects.99
Seemingly implicit in their view is an explanation that while
everyone knows that one cannot survive being blown to bits, lay
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

See id. at 138-39.
See id. at 134, 140.
Id. at 140.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 134-38.
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people do not initially know about the mechanisms through which
drugs have their effects.100 Once people know more about the brain
and fully accept propositions like “you cannot reduce testosterone to
a score of twenty without diminishing a valuable sexual desire,”
they will realize that administering a drug that reduces an individual’s testosterone to twenty constitutes diminishing the valuable
sexual desire.101
The difficulty with using the argument above to try to distinguish
neurointerventions from prison is that the same logic implies that
the more we know about the neurological and psychological effects
of prison, the more those effects will seem intended. For example,
consider the following findings:
In neuropsychology, the functions that are at the base of selfregulation are called executive functions, such as working
memory, sustained attention, impulse control, planning and
cognitive flexibility. The prefrontal cortex of the brain is crucial
for self-regulation and executive functions.... The prefrontal
cortex and, thus, self-regulation and executive functions are
sensitive to environmental influences.... A recent study ... found
a decline in executive functions after only 3 months of imprisonment. More specifically, the participants, tested within 1 week
after arrival, and retested after 3 months of imprisonment,
performed worse on neuropsychological tasks measuring attention and impulse control. It is hypothesized that this decline
in executive functions is due to the impoverished prison environment.102

The more brain science progresses and the more studies of this
kind are conducted, the clearer it may become that we cannot keep
people—or at least people with certain mental conditions or prior
brain states—in prison without some deterioration in brain functions and in the mental capacities involved in self-regulation.103
Following Birks and Buyx’s logic, this makes imprisonment and the
deterioration in mental capacity and brain function look more like
a constitutive relationship than a causal one, which would preclude
100.
101.
102.
103.

See id.
See id. at 139-40.
Ligthart et al., supra note 15, at 292-93 (footnotes omitted).
See id.
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the state from arguing that the adverse impact of prison on mental
integrity is merely an unintended side effect.104 The logic of Birks
and Buyx’s own argument undermines their conclusion that we can
use the side effect/intention distinction to show that prison’s adverse
impact on mental integrity is easier to justify than neurointervention’s adverse impact on mental integrity.105
James Lim makes a similar point from a more sociological perspective, arguing:
[O]ur self-worth, identity, rationality, and capacities such as
autonomy ... depend on our status as social beings. Some have
even argued that our capacities do not just depend on our
relationships, but that they are “constitutively social.” As Taylor
argues, “Something only offends my dignity because it upsets or
challenges the way I present, project or express myself in this
public space.” If this is true, then incarceration, which constitutively deprives individuals of particularly valuable social interactions, and designates for them a certain social status as
untrustworthy and unworthy of participating in society, also
constitutes a harm to an individual’s self-conception. Arguably,
it is equivalent to interferences on our mental capacities.106

It is submitted that this logic goes some way toward showing that
the adverse impact of prison on mental integrity is more like the
adverse impact of neurointerventions on mental integrity than had
traditionally been assumed.107 However, it is possible to resist the
conclusion that the mental-integrity-undermining impact of prison
is intended. Just as it was argued above that administering a drug
that reduces testosterone causes, but does not constitute, the diminishment of a valuable desire,108 sending someone to prison causes,
but does not constitute, impairment of brain functions. Knowing a
lot about the strength of the causal connection between an action
and an effect does not, by itself, make the action intended. If it did,
then well-informed doctors would intend their patients to suffer
the known adverse effects of medication and there could be no
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

See Birks & Buyx, supra note 2, at 139-41.
See id.
Lim, supra note 16, at 169 (citations omitted).
See id.
See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
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known but unintended side effects.109 It is plausible that doctors
would find this counterintuitive, which suggests that the intuition
that medicine can have known, unintended side effects does not just
rest on lay people’s ignorance of drugs’ causal mechanisms. So, even
if a judge became very familiar with the adverse impact of prison on
offenders’ mental capacity and brain functions, this would not show
that the judge intends offenders’ mental capacity and brain
functions to deteriorate when the judge sentences the offender to
prison.
Having said this, it is questionable whether the intention/side
effect distinction has the moral weight in this context that many
have assigned to it.110 This Article will consider two alternative reasons for this. Firstly, intended effects and side effects may lie on a
spectrum, and the closer the mental-integrity-undermining effects
of a punishment or neurointervention fall toward the intended end
of the spectrum, the harder the punishment or neurointervention
may be to justify.111 Knowledge that one’s action always has a particular effect, or is virtually certain to have that effect,112 may be one
109. See Birks & Buyx, supra note 2, at 135.
110. See, e.g., id. at 134, 137.
111. The idea that intentions and side effects lie on a spectrum has been put forward by
William J. Fitzpatrick, The Intend/Foresee Distinction and the Problem of “Closeness,” 128
PHIL. STUD. 585, 606-07 (2006); Timothy Chappell, Two Distinctions that Do Make a
Difference: The Action/Omission Distinction and the Principle of Double Effect, 77 PHIL. 211,
214-15 (2002). However, they do not analyze the spectrum in the way outlined in the
accompanying text.
112. See generally Victor Tadros, The Homicide Ladder, 69 MOD. L. REV. 601, 604 (2006)
(providing a general definition of a virtually certain effect in the criminal context). Knowledge
that an effect is virtually certain to occur is sometimes referred to as “oblique intention” in
criminal law theory, and it is sometimes suggested that this is a type of intention. A. P.
Simester, Moral Certainty and the Boundaries of Intention, 16 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 445,
452-53 (1996). In English law, in the leading murder case of R. v. Woollin, the court held that
where the accused foresaw that the effect (death or serious bodily harm) was virtually certain
to occur, the jury was entitled to find intention. [1999] 1 AC 82 (HL). In the Scottish murder
case of Petto v. HM Advocate, per Lord Justice Clerk, foresight with virtual certainty was
“equiparated with” intention. [2011] HCJAC [13]. There are convincing counterexamples to
the idea that knowledge with virtual certainty is the same as intention. For instance, a father
who drops his baby from a burning skyscraper because it is the only possibility of saving the
baby’s life does not intend to kill the baby even though the baby’s death is virtually certain
to occur. JONATHAN HERRING, CRIMINAL LAW 168 (8th ed. 2018). This counterexample also
suggests that knowledge with virtual certainty by itself cannot push an effect toward the
intended end of the spectrum, which is one reason why I have suggested that the position in
the spectrum may be determined by a range of factors. The last two factors listed in the text,
which I have suggested are indicative of near-intention, do not apply to the father.
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factor among others that helps to place the effect closer to the
intended end of the spectrum, though it is still unintended, strictly
speaking. Another factor that may help to place the effect closer to
the intended end of the spectrum could include whether it occurs at
the same time as the intended effect.113 In the case of incarceration,
the intended effect of confinement in the under-stimulating environment of prison occurs simultaneously with the deterioration of
the offender’s mental capacity and brain functions, which is
unintended but perhaps more similar to an intended effect than
effects that are more remote in time.114 The fact that the explorer
exploding occurred simultaneously with his death may be one factor
leading us to conclude that both of those things are intended.
Another factor that may place the effect toward the intended end of
the spectrum is the presence of alternative courses of action—which
would not have caused the effect (or not to the same extent)—that
the actor refused to take.115 A final factor may be the actor’s failure
to take available steps to mitigate the adverse impact of the effect.116
A second, alternative, and probably preferable line of argument
is that in some situations the actor is not entitled to rely on the fact
that the adverse effect of his action was an unintended side effect
and this fact does not significantly diminish the wrongfulness of the
action. The last two factors mentioned in the previous paragraph
are particularly relevant here.117 If a doctor, at a patient’s request,
gives the patient a pain-relief drug in order to ease the patient’s
suffering, but the doctor foresees that the drug will hasten death,
then it is often argued that death is an unintended side effect and
the doctor can rely on this fact when denying that he is guilty of any

113. See generally Mikkel C. Vinding et al., The Time Between Intention and Action Affects
the Experience of Action, 9 FRONTIERS HUM. NEUROSCIENCE 1 (2015) (hypothesizing that the
delay between the decision to act and the action renders the consequences less intentional).
114. See Ligthart et al., supra note 15, at 288, 292-93.
115. See Chappell, supra note 111, at 214-25.
116. See generally FOOT, supra note 75, at 23 (considering the morality of a trolley driver’s
attempt to mitigate the adverse impact of the inevitable crash by diverting from a track with
five potential victims to a track with one potential victim). This factor is problematic because
it seems unlikely that something someone does after the intentional action that causes the
effect could alter the extent to which the effect was intended. This is one reason why the
second, alternative explanation given in the text seems preferable.
117. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
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crime.118 However, now imagine that the doctor also had an alternative, effective pain-relief drug that did not hasten death and the
doctor intentionally refused to use it. In the latter case, even if
hastening death were still an unintended side effect of the doctor’s
chosen drug, then the doctor should not be able to rely on this fact,
as this fact would not significantly diminish the wrongfulness of administering the drug.119 Or imagine that only one pain-relief drug
is available that would have the unintended side effect of hastening
death if an antidote were not also administered, and the doctor
decides when administering the death-causing drug not to administer the antidote. Again, the doctor should not be able to rely on the
fact that the patient’s death was an unintended side effect of the
drug the doctor administered, as this would not diminish the
wrongfulness of his action.120
These considerations cast some doubt on whether the intention/side effect distinction has the moral weight in this context that
some have previously assumed.121 Even if the integrity-undermining
effects of incarceration are unintended (or less intended) than the
integrity-undermining effects of neurointerventions, it does not
follow that imposing mandatory incarceration on offenders is compatible with the right to mental integrity. As suggested in the next
Part, there may sometimes be alternative policies to mandatory
incarceration which have less of an adverse impact on mental
integrity.122 If the state refuses to adopt such policies, then the claim
that undermining mental integrity is a mere side effect of imprisonment does not necessarily weaken or remove the mental-integritybased objection against mandatory incarceration.
118. See, e.g., Henry Palmer, Dr. Adams’ Trial for Murder, in THE CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
365, 375-76 (1957).
119. Cf. id. This is not meant to exclude the possibility that there might be other considerations in such a case that meant that the doctor’s action was not wrong.
120. Cf. id. One might object that, in this case, administering the drug is not wrongful—the
omission to mitigate the effect of the drug is wrongful. In response, it seems plausible that if
he intended at the time of administering the pain-relief drug not to administer the antidote,
then administering the death-causing drug was part of his wrongful course of conduct. The
course of conduct of this doctor (Dr. A) is somewhat more wrongful than the conduct of Dr. B,
who simply fails to give the antidote to a patient who has already been given the deathcausing drug by Dr. C.
121. See, e.g., Birks & Buyx, supra note 2, at 134, 137.
122. See, e.g., infra Part III.
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III. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
This Part will discuss some of the practical implications of the
arguments I have set out in the previous Part. If we regard the
adverse effects of prison and neurointerventions as roughly morally
equivalent where their effects are similarly severe, one way to
respond is to be equally willing to impose either and allow the state
to impose whichever is most effective at preventing crime. In
contrast, this Article will favor a second, human-rights-based
approach, which aims to respect the offender’s right to mental
integrity.
In some situations, there may be alternative policies to mandatory incarceration that would have less of an adverse impact on
mental integrity. Where forms of incarceration and neurointerventions are available that are similarly effective and humane,
offenders should be offered the choice between these options. This
policy could potentially reduce the extent to which both incarceration and neurointerventions infringe the right to mental integrity.
As explained in more detail below, there are at least two possible
ways in which an intervention can infringe the right to mental
integrity: (1) by undermining a valuable aspect of the offender’s
psychological makeup, or (2) by expressing disrespect for the
offender’s valuable mental capacities.123
Offering offenders the choice between the neurointervention and
incarceration could—at least in some situations—avoid or minimize
both types of infringement. Regarding valuable aspects of the offender’s psychological make-up, different interventions/punishments
may affect the offender’s psychology in different ways, and each
method may differ in the extent to which it adversely affects various
aspects of the offender’s psychology.124 The question of which intervention affects mental integrity to the greatest extent may depend on which conception of mental integrity is adopted. Reasonable

123. See, e.g., Lisa Forsberg, Anti-Libidinal Interventions and Human Rights, 21 HUM.RTS.
L. REV. 384, 402 (2021).
124. See generally Danielle Wallace & Xia Wang, Does In-Prison Physical and Mental
Health Impact Recidivism?, 11 SS M-POPULATION HEALTH 1 (2020) (discussing the mental
impact of various prison conditions on different populations).
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people may disagree, for example, about whether the social conception of self-respect that Lim described,125 which can be affected
by incarceration, is more valuable to them than aspects of their
psychology that might be affected by neurointerventions.126 In such
a situation, it is undesirable for the state to attempt to decide on the
offender’s behalf which aspect of—or conception of—the offender’s
mental integrity is most valuable.127 Rather, offenders should be
offered the choice between the different interventions, as this takes
account of what is valuable to the particular offender.128 For example, the offender might highly value his legitimate sexual desires
that might be weakened through the side effects of neurointerventions; or the offender might value the ability to reform himself by
engaging in practical deliberation about why he should not act on
his preexisting illegitimate desires rather than having those desires
directly weakened by neurointerventions.
Giving offenders some choice between the sentencing options
could reduce the likelihood that the aspects of their psychology that
offenders themselves most value will be impacted. Secondly, giving
the offender the choice between different humane sentencing
options can show respect for the offender’s valuable capacities by
recognizing that the offenders have the valuable mental capacities
that enable them to make informed choices about such issues.129
Furthermore, it is possible to mitigate some of the adverse effects of
incarceration on mental integrity.130 For example, Sjous Ligthart
and others point out that enriching the prison environment by
125. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
126. See Lim, supra note 16.
127. See Birks & Buyx, supra note 2, at 134.
128. See, e.g., Geraldine Sealey, Some Sex Offenders Opt for Castration, ABC NEWS (Jan.
7, 2006, 10:08 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=93947&page=1 [https://perma.cc/
6XNS-AJ8V].
129. See generally Farah Focquaert et al., Offering Neurointerventions to Offenders with
Cognitive-Emotional Impairments: Ethical and Criminal Justice Aspects, in NEUROINTERVENTIONS AND THE LAW (Nicole A. Vincent et al. eds. 2020) (arguing that, under certain circumstances, granting offenders the choice of neurointervention increases the likelihood of
successful therapy outcomes). If the sentencing options involve excessive hardship or are
wrongful in some other way, then offering the choice per se will not necessarily make the
situation morally better or more respectful. See id. For example, giving offenders the choice
between waterboarding or thumbscrews would not make these into respectful forms of
punishment.
130. See Ligthart et al., supra note 15, at 296-97.
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providing more opportunities for exercise and education can, to
some extent, counteract the damaging neurological effects of understimulation.131 These considerations suggest that the state has an
obligation to research ways of minimizing the adverse effects of both
prison and neurointerventions on mental integrity and mitigate
these adverse effects where possible.132
In light of the above philosophical discussion, the remainder of
this Article will make some suggestions about what the most
ethically defensible interpretation and development of certain aspects of the legal right against degrading treatment133 would be.134
This Article will focus on the right against degrading treatment
because this legal right includes aspects of the moral right to mental
integrity that are particularly relevant in the context of criminal
rehabilitation.135 Specifically, according to comments in recent
ECHR case law discussed below, Article 3 includes respect for, and
protection of, the mental capacities required for criminals to reform
themselves, to be rehabilitated, and to reintegrate into society.136

131. See id.
132. The idea of giving offenders the choice between neurointerventions and prison has
been defended before, but based on rationales that differ in important respects from the
arguments presented in this Article. See, e.g., Focquaert et al., supra note 129; Farah
Focquaert & Adrian Raine, Ethics of Community-Based Sanctions, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS 144, 144-48 (Shannon M. Barton-Bellessa ed., 2012); Elizabeth
Shaw, Cognitive Enhancement and Criminal Behavior, in COGNITIVE ENHANCEMENT: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE 265, 267-69 (Elisabeth Hildt & Andreas G. Franke eds.,
2013).
133. This Article will focus on the “degrading treatment” aspect of Article 3, because the
suffering caused by under-stimulating prison conditions or certain mandatory neurointerventions may not cause the level of suffering required for “torture” or “inhuman
treatment.” See Aydin v. Turkey, 1997-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1866; JOHN COOPER, CRUELTY: AN
ANALYSIS OF ARTICLE 3 (2003).
134. Aspects of the moral right to mental integrity are relevant to several legal rights that
are protected by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); for example, Article 8
protects the right to privacy, Article 9 protects the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and
religion, and Article 3 prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment. See FREDE CASTBERG, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 83, 138, 146
(Torkel Opsahl & Thomas Ouchterlony eds., 1974). On the connection between these rights
and mental integrity, see, for example, PAUL TIEDEMANN, PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 139-55 (2020); Sjors L.T.J. Ligthart, Coercive Neuroimaging, Criminal Law,
and Privacy: A European Perspective, 6 J. L. & BIOSCIENCES 289, 293-309 (2019); Bublitz &
Merkel, supra note 42, at 51-60.
135. See CASTBERG, supra note 134, at 83.
136. See id.
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The right against degrading treatment is closely connected with
the idea of respect for human dignity,137 which echoes the concern
in the literature on mental integrity to show respect for rational
agency.138 However, the ECHR case law, unlike the literature on the
moral right to mental integrity, focuses primarily on experiential
suffering.139 Degrading treatment or punishment has been described
as treatment which arouses “feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority” capable of “humiliating” those subjected to it and of “breaking
their physical and moral resistance.”140 It is unclear from the case
law the extent to which experiential suffering is an essential component of Article 3, or whether disrespect for human dignity in the
absence of experiential suffering could amount to degrading treatment. This Article proposes that the legal interpretation of degrading treatment should include disrespect for rational agency—even
in the absence of experiential suffering—as this would provide better legal protection for the moral right to mental integrity.141
It is also worth noting that Article 3 has the potential to provide
especially effective support for the right to mental integrity because
Article 3 is an absolute right.142 Once an absolute right is engaged,
states cannot justify restricting it in order to protect the public
interest or the rights of others,143 nor can signatories to the ECHR

137. See, e.g., Svinarenko and Slyadnev v. Russia 2014-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 181; Murray v.
Netherlands, App. No. 10511/10 (Apr. 26, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-162614
[https://perma.cc/H8WN-TYUK].
138. See, e.g., Bublitz & Merkel, supra note 42, at 53-55.
139. See, e.g., Sviarenko, 2014 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 183; Murray, 2016 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 68-69.
140. See V v. United Kingdom, 1999-1X Eur. Ct. H.R. 111 ¶ 71; Peers v. Greece, 2001-III
Eur. Ct. H.R. 275 ¶¶ 74-75.
141. See infra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
142. See Michael K. Addo & Nicholas Grief, Does Article 3 of the European Convention on
Human Rights Enshrine Absolute Rights?, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 510, 523 (1998) (“[I]t is now
generally accepted that Article 3 ... guarantees absolute rights.”).
143. See id. at 513. However, it is debatable whether the ECHR’s interpretation of Article
3 is really consistent with this notion of an absolute right or whether ECHR has taken into
account public interest considerations after all. See, e.g., Natasa Mavronicola, Crime,
Punishment and Article 3 ECHR: Puzzles and Prospects of Applying an Absolute Right in a
Penal Context, 5 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 721, 733-39 (2015); Mark D. Kielsgard & John Khiatini
Vinod, Trending Toward Precaution at What Cost? Reconciling Positive and Negative Human
Rights Obligations in the Use of Neuro Intervention for Sex Offenders, 18 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J.
393, 400-38 (2019).
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suspend, derogate, or depart from Article 3, even in times of war or
national emergencies.144
In a series of cases on Article 3—in the context of life sentences—
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has increasingly
emphasized the importance of rehabilitating offenders.145 Rehabilitation is defined as facilitating offenders’ reintegration into society
with the aim of, for example, social protection and crime prevention.146 The case law on the implications of Article 3 for criminal
rehabilitation is ambiguous and still developing.147 States are under
a positive obligation to facilitate offenders’ rehabilitation.148
The ECtHR has also commented on the State’s negative obligation to not undermine the capacities required for rehabilitation.149
For example, in the context of solitary confinement, the ECtHR
noted that lack of “appropriate mental and physical stimulation are
likely, in the long term, to have damaging effects, resulting in a
deterioration of mental faculties and social abilities.”150 Some comments suggest that the capacity for positive change or reform are
particularly worthy of protection and central to our common humanity.151 In the case of Vinter and Others v. United Kingdom,
Judge Power-Forde, in her concurring judgment, stated: “Those who
commit the most abhorrent and egregious of acts and who inflict
untold suffering upon others, nevertheless retain their fundamental
humanity and carry within themselves the capacity to change.”152
The value of the offender’s capacity for reform through exercising

144. CASTBERG, supra note 134, at 165.
145. See, e.g., Vinter and Others v. United Kingdom, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 317 (2013);
Khoroshenko v. Russia, 2015-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 329; Hutchinson v. United Kingdom, App. No.
57592/08 (Jan. 17, 2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-170347 [https://perma.cc/P4H2DN3N].
146. See Murray v. Netherlands, App. No. 10511/10 (Apr. 26, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.
int/eng?i=001-162614 [https://perma.cc/H8WN-TYUK].
147. See, e.g., Vinter, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R., at 319-21.
148. See Murray, App. No. 10511/10, ¶104.
149. See id.
150. See Piechowicz v. Poland, App No. 20071/07, ¶ 173 (Apr. 17, 2012), http://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/eng?i=001-110499 [https://perma.cc/R3S3-HL9P].
151. See, e.g., Why Promote Prison Reform?, UNITED NATIONS OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME,
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/justice-and-prison-reform/prison-reform-and-alternatives-toimprisonment.html [https://perma.cc/Z7HY-6UG8].
152. See Vinter, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R., at 358 (Power-Forde, J., concurring).
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rational agency is also a theme discussed in the literature on neurointerventions and the moral right to mental integrity.153
Ligthart and others persuasively argued that, in light of
neuroscientific findings on the negative neuropsychological effects
of under-stimulation, the ECtHR should recognize a wider range of
restrictive prison conditions as being in breach of Article 3 because
under-stimulation can undermine the mental capacities required for
reform.154 The scope of Article 3’s prohibitions should be expanded
to include both restrictive prison conditions, as Ligthart and others
proposed, and the undermining of mental capacities—even in the
absence of mental suffering.155
The ECtHR has not applied the comments about the value of the
offender’s “capacity to change” to mandatory neurointerventions.156
The ECtHR’s discussion of the compulsory administration of brainaltering interventions to offenders has focused on the concept of
“medical necessity” rather than penological goals.157 It is submitted
that the court should recognize the value of the capacity to reform
in the context of compulsory brain interventions as well.158
Domestic laws permit these interventions to be given to rational
offenders who retain the capacity to give or withhold consent.159
Therefore, the recipients still presumably “carry within themselves
the capacity to change.”160 The assertion that a particular treatment
is a medical necessity cannot deprive the requirement to respect the
153. See, e.g., Douglas, supra note 1, at 112-16; Shaw, supra note 1, at 2, 12-18.
154. See Ligthart et al., supra note 15, at 299.
155. See id. at 299-300.
156. See Forsberg, supra note 123, at 391-86.
157. See id. at 394.
158. See generally id. at 394-96 (“Article 3 does not allow for any type of proportionality of
necessity analysis that weighs how necessary a (degrading/inhuman) punishment is to achieve
a public aim” like rehabilitation; therefore, capacity to ECtHR’s current approach does not
permit for consideration of an individual inmate’s capacity to reform.).
159. See, e.g., Mental Health Act 1983, c. 20 § 58 (U.K.). For example, in England and
Wales, criminal courts can sentence mentally disordered offenders to detention in hospital,
where they may be given compulsory interventions, even if they have the capacity to refuse
consent. Id. § 36. Section 63 permits nonconsensual interventions except psychosurgery,
hormone implants, electro-convulsive therapy, and psychiatric medications lasting more than
three months. Id. § 63. Section 58 permits nonconsensual psychiatric medications lasting
more than three months, provided that the requirements concerning approval by two medical
practitioners are met. Id. § 58.
160. See Vinter and Others v. United Kingdom, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R., 317, 355 (PowerForde, J., concurring).

2022]

NEUROSCIENCE, CRIMINAL SENTENCING, HUMAN RIGHTS

1437

offender’s capacity for reform of its moral weight.161 Lisa Forsberg
has argued that the “medical necessity” requirement can easily be
met.162 Arguably, even “treatments,” whose main goal is to protect
society by preventing reoffending, and which are imposed on rational offenders, may be deemed “medically necessary.”163 If the main
goal of the neurointervention—social protection—is the same as the
goal of incarceration, and the ECtHR has deemed that the latter
cannot justify degrading treatment under Article 3, then the goals
of the neurointervention cannot justify such treatment either.164
Under restrictive conditions, prison can fail to respect offenders’
capacity for reform and rehabilitation by actually undermining
this capacity.165 In contrast, mandatory neurointerventions would
fail to respect the capacity for reform and rehabilitation by denying offenders the capacity to reform themselves through exercising
their own agency.166 As previously argued, directly reshaping the
offender’s character or moral motivations “implies that offenders
are radically defective with regard to one of the most fundamental
aspects of their agency.”167 Forcibly reshaping the individual in this
way represents him as having less value than he should be accorded.168 This goes beyond the message that is an essential part of
punishment—“that the offender committed a wrong on a particular
occasion.”169
Gabriel De Marco and Thomas Douglas have replied to my
argument by claiming that there may be situations, such as with
repeat offenders, when the state has evidence that the offender
lacks or is seriously deficient in the higher order rational capacity

161. See generally id. (“[D]eserved though [the punishment] may be ... [prisoners] ought not
to be deprived entirely of [the hope to atone]. To deny them the experience of hope would be
to deny a fundamental aspect of their humanity.”).
162. See Forsberg, supra note 123, at 391-96.
163. See Dvoracek v. Slovakia, App. No. 30754/04 (July 28, 2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-93768 [https://perma.cc/U9XS-9TMT]; Kielsgard & Vinod, supra note 143, at 396407; Elizabeth Shaw, Retributivism and the Moral Enhancement of Criminals Through Brain
Interventions, 83 ROYAL INST. PHIL. SUPPLEMENT 251, 256-70 (2018).
164. See Shaw, supra note 163, at 259-61.
165. See Ligthart et al., supra note 15, at 299.
166. See Shaw, supra note 1, at 2, 12-18.
167. Shaw, supra note 1, at 13.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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to correct one’s failings and to reform.170 If it is true that the
offender lacks this rational capacity, then De Marco and Douglas
argue it is not a negative misrepresentation.171
In reply, firstly, even repeat offending does not prove that the
offender lacks the capacity to reform.172 By convicting the offender
rather than acquitting him on the basis of insanity, the state
assumed that he is a rational agent.173 Denying that he has the
rational capacities required to change his behavior seems to
contradict this assumption.174 Secondly, sending the message that
offenders—or a certain class of offenders—lack this capacity would
negatively misrepresent these offenders’ value even if it were true
that they lacked this capacity.175 People would still be valuable and
worthy of moral consideration even if they lacked this capacity.
Nevertheless, it is plausible that the capacity for moral improvement has come to symbolize an agent’s value and our common humanity, probably because most agents share the capacity, value it,
and would be outraged if they were deprived of it.176 Highlighting
that a class of offenders lacks this fundamental capacity is exclusionary and represents them as inferior.177 Respect can be shown
by celebrating valuable capacities when agents possess them (for an
analogy, consider celebrating peoples’ intellectual achievements)
and disrespect can be shown by emphasizing the lack of a capacity
(for an analogy, consider publicly declaring that certain individuals

170. See Gabriel De Marco & Thomas Douglas, The Expressivist Objection to Nonconsensual
Neurocorrectives, CRIM.L.&PHIL. (2021), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11572021-09566-9 [https://perma.cc/G64H-KSCJ].
171. See id.
172. See PENAL REFORM INT’L, ALTERNATIVES TO THE DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION PACK
7 (2015).
173. See, e.g., T.V. Asokan, The Insanity Defense: Related Issues, 58 INDIAN J. PSYCHIATRY
191 (2016).
174. See id.
175. See generally Eric Lewis, Crime, Fear, and the Republicans, MARSHALL PROJECT (Sept.
15, 2015, 7:15 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/09/15/crime-fear-and-therepublicans [https://perma.cc/227A-MJ7Q] (discussing generally how government’s treatment
of prisoners affects public opinion of prisoners).
176. See, e.g., Vinter and Others v. United Kingdom, 2013-III Eur. Ct. H.R., 317, 358
(Power-Forde, J., concurring).
177. See id. (“To deny them the experience of hope [of atonement] would be to deny a
fundamental aspect of their humanity and, to do that, would be degrading.”).
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performed poorly on some measure of intelligence) regardless of
whether that were true.
It might be objected that, if it were true that certain offenders
could not be rehabilitated without neurointerventions, and effective
rehabilitative neurointerventions were available, these offenders
should be compelled to receive them, even if this were disrespectful.178 For example, Sebastian Holmen argues that the respect requirement could be outweighed by the value of protecting future
victims and their families from harm.179 In response, as noted above,
even if it were true that some noninsane offenders lacked the capacity to be rehabilitated without neurointerventions, it is unlikely
that the state could prove this.180 Furthermore, forcing offenders to
receive neurointerventions rather than offering neurointerventions
as an option not only implies that offenders lack the rational capacities to be rehabilitated without neurointerventions—it also implies that they lack the rational capacity to assess whether there are
good reasons for accepting the option of neurointerventions.181 It
would be even harder for the state to prove that noninsane offenders also lacked this capacity.182 No one is proposing that the state
should simply let hard-to-rehabilitate offenders walk free, leaving
potential victims unprotected. The importance of protecting potential victims can adequately be recognized by detaining offenders in
conditions that are designed to facilitate their rehabilitation183 and,
where appropriate, providing offenders with the choice between
neurointerventions and other forms of rehabilitation.184
My argument has some similarities with Christopher Bennett’s
account of “opacity respect”—the idea that it shows respect for the
basic equality of all moral agents to refrain from investigating the
extent to which an individual possesses certain fundamental
agential capacities.185 According to Bennett, provided the agent
178. See, e.g., Sebastian Jon Holmen, Respect, Punishment and Mandatory Neurointerventions, 14 NEUROETHICS 167 (2021).
179. Id.
180. See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
181. See Shaw, supra note 2, at 103-05.
182. See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
183. See Ligthart et al., supra note 15, at 296-97.
184. See Shaw, supra note 163, at 259.
185. See Christopher Bennett, Intrusive Intervention and Opacity Respect, in TREATMENT
FOR CRIME, supra note 1, at 255, 261.
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meets a certain threshold of rationality that all offenders who were
convicted rather than found legally insane have met, opacity respect
requires refraining from investigating variations above this threshold.186 The agential capacities of an individual who has passed the
minimum rationality threshold should be “opaque” in that the state
should be barred from assessing the extent to which some of the
individual’s rational capacities may be defective,187 and the state
should be barred from basing its response to the offender on any
information it may have about the defectiveness of his agential
capacities.188
However, there are some key differences between my argument
and Bennett’s conception of opacity respect. My argument focuses
specifically on the disrespect of implying that offenders lack, or are
seriously defective with regard to, a particularly important aspect
of rationality: the ability to reform oneself.189 This disrespect can be
shown by denying offenders the opportunity to reform themselves
through the exercise of their rational agency and instead simply reengineering their character or moral motivations through brain
interventions.190 In contrast, Bennett’s account of “opacity respect”
seems to interpret respect for rationality in a much broader way—a
breadth that opens his account up to the charge of overinclusiveness.191 Opacity respect would be violated by investigating “the offender’s underlying psychology” as part of “any attempt to ask why
the person acted as they did or how they could be prevented from
acting in that way in the future” and by treating them in ways that
are based on “factors other than the offender’s rational self-presentation.”192 He writes:
When relating to another person as an equal, our default
position is to take at face value the deliverances of the person’s
thought and agency, and not to look at the “mess inside” from
which it stemmed. We treat the person as an equal by dealing

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

See id.
See Shaw, supra note 163, at 256.
See Bennett, supra note 185, at 266, 269.
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
See Shaw, supra note 163, at 256.
See Bennett, supra note 185.
Id. at 266.
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with them in the image of a rational agent presenting herself to
the world on the basis of rational deliberation. We take at face
value this rational self-presentation, averting our gaze from its
psychological sources.193

Bennett’s account may be viewed as overinclusive, in that it is
hard to see why it does not rule out forms of rehabilitation, such as
talking therapies, that many people find acceptable.194 Bennett’s
response to this criticism makes some valid and important points.
However, his response seems to contradict his earlier statements,
and also makes it less clear what work the concept of “opacity respect” is meant to be doing. Bennett suggests that standard “talking
therapies” can be acceptable because they “often engage reason and
challenge the offender to think differently.”195 This is true, but these
therapies also assume that various ways in which the individual has
been and may, in the absence of therapy, go on thinking have not
been rational.196 Many therapists invite individuals to consider
whether the supposed rational justifications they present for their
actions are, in fact, merely rationalizations masking nonrational
factors that influence their actions.197 By viewing such therapies as
acceptable, Bennett seems to be abandoning the idea that respect
requires us to take “at face value [the individual’s] rational selfpresentation.”198 Bennett then replies that neurointerventions can
be distinguished from talking therapies because the former bypass
rationality, whereas the latter engage rationality.199 However, this
makes it unclear what work the concept of “opacity respect” is doing.
On Bennett’s account, there seem to be two separate requirements: (1) the requirement to engage with—rather than bypass—
rational agency, and (2) the supposed requirement to abstain from
investigating the agent’s underlying psychology, which is at the

193. Id. at 265 (footnote omitted).
194. See id. at 271-72.
195. Id. at 272.
196. See id.
197. See, e.g., Michael E. Addis & Kelly M. Carpenter, The Treatment Rationale in
Cognitive Behavior Therapy: Psychological Mechanisms and Clinical Guidelines, 7 COGNITIVE
& BEHAV. PRAC. 147, 148-50 (2000).
198. See Bennett, supra note 185, at 265.
199. See id. at 272.
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heart of his conception of opacity respect.200 If, when it comes to
talking therapies, the second requirement (that is, opacity) can be
dispensed with if the former (that is, engaging with rational agency)
has been met, why do we need to rely on opacity to explain what is
wrong about neurointerventions, rather than simply appealing to
the wrongfulness of bypassing rational agency?
In contrast, on my account, the value of engaging with offenders’
rational agency is not separate from the specific capacity that the
state should be barred from denying. Engaging with offenders’
rational agency reaffirms their possession of the specific higher
order capacity to correct their rational and moral failings through
exercising their agency.201 In contrast, mandatory neurointerventions deny this specific capacity through bypassing agency
in order to reshape offenders’ character or moral motivations.202
Rehabilitating an offender partly through consensual neurointerventions would not necessarily fail to show respect for this capacity
because taking an autonomous decision to accept help, including
help via neurointerventions, can in itself be a way of exercising the
higher order ability to start on the route to reform.203 So, giving an
offender the opportunity to exercise this higher order ability by
giving him choices about different routes to rehabilitation reaffirms his capacity to reform.204
CONCLUSION
This Article examined the role of the right to mental integrity as
a constraint on state use of neurointerventions and also discussed
the extent to which traditional forms of punishment, such as incarceration, interfere with the right to mental integrity. This Article
focused on an influential objection against neurointerventions—
the idea that neurointerventions threaten mental integrity in a way
that prison does not, because even if prison infringes mental integrity, that infringement is merely foreseen, whereas the threat

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

See id. at 259-61.
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
See Douglas, supra note 1, at 112-16; Shaw, supra note 1, at 2, 12-18.
See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
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that neurointerventions pose to mental integrity is intended. It
attempted to cast some doubt on whether the intention/side effect
distinction has the moral weight in this context that has often been
assigned to it. It argued that the intention/side effect distinction
does not warrant regarding mandatory incarceration as being
significantly less problematic than mandatory neurointerventions
in cases where the adverse effects of prison and neurointerventions
are similarly severe. This Article discussed some of the practical
implications of treating neurointerventions and prison in a roughly
similar way and argued that the state has strong obligations to
research techniques that minimize adverse so-called side effects, or
any adverse effects on mental integrity, and to offer prisoners the
choice where possible between different rehabilitative sentencing
options, some of which may include neurointerventions.

